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INTRODUCTORY STATEMENT 
The opening brief of defendant-appellant Robert Michael 
Greene demonstrated that he and his former wifef plaintiff-
respondent Cherie Annette Greenef agreed by stipulation to treat 
defendant's military retired pay as a source of income from which 
to pay spousal support, terminable upon plaintiff's remarriage, 
and not as marital property. Notwithstanding the parties' 
agreement, the trial court amended the Divorce Decree to classify 
the retired pay as marital property, thereby requiring defendant 
to pay plaintiff half of that income for the rest of his life. 
Defendant's opening brief demonstrates that the trial court's 
ruling is contrary to Utah law and constitutes an abuse of 
discretion because the Decree was modified without a showing or 
finding of changed circumstances or compelling reasons. 
In her response brief plaintiff seeks to avoid a full 
review of the issues by arguing that the facts were misrepre-
sented, that the central issue was not raised below, and that the 
Decree was not modified. Those arguments have no merit. 
REPLY TO PLAINTIFF'S STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Plaintiff argues that defendant misrepresented the 
facts; yet, plaintiff's statement of facts closely tracks 
defendant's in most material respects. The principal factual 
dispute is whether the parties, in their Stipulation and 
Agreement, divided defendant's military retired pay as marital 
property or as spousal support. As plaintiff noted, both parties 
expressed a desire to introduce evidence on that issue, but the 
trial court declined, choosing instead to resolve the issue on 
the face of the Stipulation and the other documents already in 
the record. (Tr. 32-34.) 
On the face of the Stipulation it is clear that the 
parties did not list the military retired pay as property in the 
three paragraphs designating and dividing the marital assets. 
(Addendum to Appellant's Brief 4-5, hereafter "Add.") The 
retired pay is mentioned only in paragraph eight dealing with 
payment of spousal and child support. Plaintiff disputes the 
figure of $1,370.00 in spousal support (Resp. Br. 3); however, 
the $490 portion labeled "alimony" plus the $880 portion consti-
tuting one-half of the gross retired pay equals a total spousal 
support payment of $1,370.00. That figure was obviously designed 
by the parties to meet plaintiff's "Proposed Budget" of 
$1,350.00, which jls_ in the record (contrary to plaintiff's claim 
at Resp. Br. 3). (R. 49-50; Add. 20-21.) Plaintiff also 
disputes that defendant reported the full $1370 support payment 
as alimony on his tax records (Resp. Br. 3); however, defendant's 
affidavit attesting to that fact, as well as to the parties' 
original intent, stands uncontradicted in the record. (R. 49; 
Add. 20.) Thus, the face of the documents indicates that the 
parties did not consider the retired pay as property, but as 
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income from which to pay spousal support. If this Court 
considers the Stipulation ambiguous, it should reverse and remand 
the case for presentation of evidence and specific findings on 
the issue of the military retired pay. 
Plaintiff also questions defendant's construction of 
the 1984 modification order. (Resp. Br. 2, 4.) The only rele-
vant effect of that order was to authorize plaintiff to obtain 
her half of the military retired pay directly from the Air Force. 
In making that order, the court reaffirmed that defendant was 
obligated to pay one-half of his "gross Air Force Retirement pay" 
(Add. 16), thus indicating no change in the parties' under-
standing of that phrase as used in their original Stipulation. 
The issue whether the retired pay was marital property or 
defendant's personal income was neither raised nor decided in the 
1984 proceeding. The court found no change of circumstances 
sufficient to warrant modification of the spousal support 
obligation; therefore, that obligation continued in the amounts 
specified in the Stipulation and Decree. 
Finally, it is significant that plaintiff admits the 
Divorce Decree was amended to require payment of one-half the net 
or disposable military retirement income instead of one-half the 
gross income. (Resp. Br. 8.) That amendment permitted the court 
to classify the retirement pay as marital property rather than 
personal income, and thereby alter the parties1 Stipulation. 
Plaintiff attempts to soft-pedal that amendment, but in fact it 
constitutes reversible error, as discussed below (see Point III). 
REPLY TO PLAINTIFF'S ARGUMENTS 
POINT I; THE ISSUE WHETHER UTAH LAW PERMITS MILITARY RETIREMENT 
INCOME TO BE TREATED AS MARITAL PROPERTY WAS RAISED 
AND DECIDED IN THE TRIAL COURT. 
Plaintiff argues that the issue regarding treatment of 
defendant's military retired pay as marital property or personal 
1Plaintiff considers it significant that the court's 1984 
modification order specified continued payment of $490.00 per 
month "alimony." However, that designation does not mean that 
the one-half gross military retired pay was not also spousal 
support. The uneven $490 figure is the approximate residual 
difference between the amount plaintiff requested in her 
"Proposed Budget" and the maximum support she anticipated from 
the retirement income. Only the residual portion of the support 
was labled "alimony" because the parties were uncertain how to 
designate the money from the Air Force. Since both amounts were 
listed consecutively in the same sentence of the Stipulation's 
paragraph on support payments, it is evident that they were 
intended as separate components of the total spousal support 
obligation. 
income under Utah law was not raised in the trial court. (Resp. 
Br. 10.) That arqument has no merit and is obviously intended to 
avoid review of the court's ruling. 
This dispute began when, upon plaintiff's remarriage, 
defendant moved for an order terminating the spousal support 
obligation, including the portion paid from his Air Force 
retirement income. (R. 47-48; Add. 18-19.) Plaintiff filed a 
"Response to Defendant's Motion," asserting for the first time 
that her half of the military retirement income was not spousal 
support subject to termination, but marital property to which she 
was entitled for the rest of defendant's life. (R. 51.) Those 
pleadings thus framed the central issue before the court: 
Whether defendant's military retired pay should be classified as 
personal income or marital property? (See Tr. 2-3.) 
In deciding that issue, the trial court was obviously 
required to rule in accordance with Utah law. The trial judge 
cited Woodward v. Woodward, 656 P.2d 431 (Utah 1982), for the 
unchallenged proposition that nonmilitary pensions may be 
considered a marital asset. (Tr. 16.) The court also referred 
to McCarty v. McCarty, 453 U.S. 210 (1981), and the national 
interests in treating military retired pay as personal income. 
zThe trial court referred to this central issue as "the big 
problem" (Tr. 26), or simply as "the issue" (Tr. 36-37). 
(Tr. 16-17.) The court then noted the Former Spouses' Protection 
Act, 10 U.S.C. § 1408, and queried what its effect was on Utah 
law: 
Do any of you have any cases where this has 
come up and been brought before any court where 
they interpret under military retirement how or 
what standards or goals you may have to determine 
in a decree, whether this is for support or 
whether it's for a division of the marital asset 
or anything of that nature? [Tr. 17-18.] 
Both counsel responded that they had researched the issue but had 
found no case directly on point. The court agreed that it was a 
novel question and invited counsel to submit any authorities they 
might find. (Tr. 18-19.) 
In its Memorandum Decision the trial court again cited 
Woodward and concluded that military retirement income under Utah 
law should be treated the same as nonmilitary pensions, i.e., 
subject to division as a marital asset. (Add. 24-25.) The 
court's final judgment formalized that ruling. (Add. 28.) Thus, 
the issue of how to treat defendant's military retirement income, 
having been raised and decided below, is properly renewed on 
appeal and this Court has jurisdiction to review and resolve the 
issue. 
Plaintiff argues that the Former Spouses' Protection 
Act authorizes state courts to treat military retired pay as 
marital property (Resp. Br. 11), which defendant does not 
dispute. However, that Act was intended as an accommodation to 
community property states and does not require common law 
jurisdictions to treat military retired pay as marital 
property. The issue here is whether the trial court's decision 
on the issue correctly states Utah law. The issue is one of 
first impression in this state and therefore may not be dictated 
by a trial court, but must be conclusively resolved by this 
Court. 
POINT II; THE UNIQUE CHARACTERISTICS OF MILITARY RETIRED PAY 
REQUIRE THAT IT BE TREATED AS PERSONAL INCOME RATHER 
THAN MARITAL PROPERTY. 
Plaintiff relies exclusively on Woodward v. Woodward, 
656 P.2d 431 (Utah 1982)f for the proposition that military 
retired pay should be divided as marital property. (Resp. Br. 
12-14.) However, Woodward did not decide that issue. In 
Woodward the husband was a civilian employee at Hill Air Force 
Base, id., and the Court expressly found that his "retirement 
benefits are a form of deferred compensation by the employer." 
Id. at 432, emp. added. By contrast, Mr. Greene in the present 
case was and is a member of the military, an Air Force officer, 
and his retirement income is compensation for current and 
continuing service to, and membership in, the nation's Armed 
Forces. (See Appellant's Brief 12-15.) This characteristic of 
military retirement income as compensation for current service 
and readiness is the primary reason to distinquish it from 
nonmilitary pensions. Other distinguishing factors, noted in 
defendant's opening brief, are that military retirement income 
serves the national interest of assurinq available and prepared 
armed forces in future contingencies; the income is subject to 
divestment for violation of military regulations? and it has no 
redemption value, lump sum valuer or value realizable after the 
death of the retiree. Plaintiff simply ignores these 
distinguishing characteristics of military retirement income, and 
by refusing to discuss themf concedes their validity. 
Plaintiff also misreads the scope of Woodward. That 
case did not hold that all pensions must be treated as marital 
property, which must be divided between the spouses. Woodward 
merely held that the existence of a retirement fund is one factor 
to be considered, along with other pertinent circumstances, in 
dividing the assets and setting the maintenance of the parties and 
children. 656 P.2d at 432. Cf. In re Marriage of Ellis, 
538 P.2d 1347, 1350 (Colo. App. 1975) (acknowledging that 
^If this Court were to determine that part of defendant's 
military retirement income may be deferred compensation for past 
services and that the parties' Stipulation intended to divide 
that part as property, then plaintiff would be entitled to a 
share of only that part, and the case should be remanded for a 
hearing and findings on that issue. However, if this Court 
concludes that the parties' Stipulation is binding and intended 
to treat the retired pay, not as property, but as an income 
source from which to pay spousal support, as demonstrated in 
Point II of defendant's opening brief, then no further hearing is 
necessary and the trial court's Judgment should simply be 
reversed. 
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military retirement income may be considered in dividing property 
and awarding support). If the parties, by stipulation, choose 
not to divide a pension as marital property, that is their 
prerogative. 
Finally, plaintiff attempts to discredit McCarty v* 
McCarty, 453 U.S. 210 (1981), and the other cases holding that 
military retired pay is income rather than property by citing the 
Former Spouses' Protection Act and cases from community property 
jurisdictions. As noted above, the federal Act merely altered 
the McCarty holding that community property states could not 
treat military retired pay as marital property. The supporting 
rationale of McCarty and the other federal cases is still valid 
as applied in common law jurisdictions such as Utah. As 
demonstrated by In re Marriage of Mattson, 694 P.2d 1285 (Colo. 
App. 1984); Grant v. Grant, 685 P.2d 327 (Kan. App. 1984); Koenes 
v. Koenes, 478 N.E.2d 1240 (Ind. App. 1985), and other cases 
decided after the federal Act, common law jurisdictions may 
continue treating military retired pay as personal income rather 
than marital property.* 
^Plaintiff questions the authority of Slaughter v. 
Slaughter, 18 Utah 2d 274, 421 P.2d 503 (1966), by misstating the 
point for which it was cited. (Resp. Br. 15.) Defendant did not 
claim that Slaughter decided the military retirement pay issue. 
(See Appellant's Br. 12.) No reported Utah case has decided the 
issue. 
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POINT III: THE TRIAL COURT DID AMEND THE DIVORCE DECREE TO ALLOW 
DEFENDANT'S MILITARY RETIREMENT INCOME TO BE DIVIDED 
AS MARITAL PROPERTY. 
Plaintiff admits that neither partyf in their 
pleadings, requested the trial court to amend the Divorce Decree 
and that neither party presented evidence in support of such an 
amendment. (Resp. Br. 20.) Defendant did not request an 
amendment; he merely wanted the Decree enforced as written, to 
require termination of the entire spousal support payment upon 
plaintiff's remarriage. Plaintiff did not request an amendment 
until she realized the inconsistency and impossibility of 
claiming a property interest in one-half of defendant's gross 
retired pay. When the court and the parties all agreed that the 
maximum property interest awardable would be one-half the net or 
disposable pay, plaintiff's counsel promptly requested "an 
amendment to make it net." (Tr. 20.) In two subsequent state-
ments plaintiff's counsel renewed that oral plea for an amendment 
to the Decree. (Tr. 21, 35.) Thus, it is somewhat disingenuous 
for plaintiff now to argue that the amendment was defendant's 
idea or that defendant agreed to that amendment. (Resp. Br. 20, 
22.) 
Plaintiff eventually concedes that the trial court did 
in fact amend the Decree as requested to award one-half the net 
retired pay. (Resp. Br. 21.) The purpose and effect of that 
amendment was to allow the retired pay to be classified and 
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divided as marital property rather than personal income paid 
toward spousal support• The trial court acknowledged that pur-
pose and effect in its Memorandum Decision (Add. 24-25) and in 
its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, numbers 3 through 6 
(Add. 30-32). However, the court received no evidence in support 
of the amendment and made no finding of changed circumstances or 
compelling reasons to justify the amendment, as plaintiff admits 
(Resp. Br. 22), and as reguired by Utah law. E.g., Shioji v. 
Shioji, 671 P.2d 135 (Utah 1983); Despain v. Despain, 610 P.2d 
1303 (Utah 1980); Crofts v. Crofts, 21 Utah 2d 332, 445 P.2d 701, 
703 (1968) (trial court cannot "change or cancel one word of the 
judgment" without a finding of changed circumstances). 
Therefore, the amendment must be set aside and the Decree 
enforced as originally entered. 
Finally, plaintiff argues that principles of contract 
construction do not apply in this case because the trial court 
was not construing a contract, but was construing only the 
Decree. (Resp. Br. 23-24.) That argument has no merit. It is 
undisputed that the issue whether the retired pay was divided in 
the Stipulation as property or spousal support was not raised 
DIn an attempt to excuse the absence of the necessary 
finding, plaintiff spends time arguing what the trial court 
may have done, but which it concededly did not do. (Resp. 
Br. 23.) These arguments reguire no response. 
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prior to entry of the Decree, Because of that factf both parties 
offered to present evidence on their interpretation of the 
Stipulation. The trial court refused, stating that he would 
review the Stipulation and request parol evidence only if he 
considered it ambiguous. (Tr. 32-34.) The trial court's 
Memorandum Decision also makes clear that the court based its 
judgment on a construction of the Stipulation. (Add. 25.) 
Divorce stipulations are considered contracts and are construed 
by the same principles as other contracts. See Land v. Land, 605 
P.2d 1248, 1251 (Utah 1980); Mathie v. Mathie, 12 Utah 2d 116, 
363 P.2d 779, 782-84 (1961). Therefore, in reviewing the trial 
court's construction of the parties' Stipulation, this Court must 
apply the same standards as used in reviewing the construction of 
other contracts. Under those standards, this Court owes no 
deference to the trial court's construction, but is free to make 
its own independent interpretation. E.g., Wade v. Utah Farm 
Bureau Ins. Co., 700 P.2d 1093, 1095 (Utah 1985) .6 
°This court may construe the Stipulation in defendant's 
favor either on the basis that it was clear on its face in 
giving one-half the "gross" retired pay in the same sentence 
with other spousal support, or on the basis that it was 
ambiguous and should therefore be construed against the 
plaintiff, whose attorney drafted it. See Evenson Masonry 
Inc. v. Eldred, 273 Or. 770, 543 P.2d 663 (1975) (existence 
of ambiguity is question of law reviewable on appeal); 
Abbott v. Christensen, 660 P.2d 254, 257 (Utah 1983) 
(contract ambiguity interpreted against drafting party). 
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CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing, this Court must reverse the 
trial court's Judgment. 
Dated this Avday of February, 1987. 
Respectfully submitted, 
KIRTON, McCONKIE & BUSHNELL 
By *y£^jtsv^^7 SU^c^x 
Merrill F. Nelson 
Attorneys for Defendant-Appellant 
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